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CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS. 
A REVIEW OF DR. CARUS' "FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS" AND 
"THE SURD OF METAPHYSICS.'" 
T H E S E two volumes may be presumed to give a fairly satisfactory account 
of Dr. Carus' philosophy. His writings are voluminous, but it is fair to 
assume that his other books are either an explication or an application of 
the philosophical principles here set forth. And this assumption is justified 
in that the former of these two volumes purports to be and actually is a 
careful treatise upon the great themes of philosophy, while the latter, 
although directed to a specific point in metaphysical inquiry, serves to pre-
sent more fully and clearly the author's views upon the fundamental ques-
tions involved; so that we have hero, in a nutshell, the Philosophy of The 
Open Court. This is notwithstanding what is told us in the Preface to the 
Fundamental Problems, namely, that nearly the whole of its contents first 
appeared as editorial articles in The Open Court. A glance at the Table of 
Contents reveals not only a general connection between the essays, but also a 
substantial identity of theme and even a logical consecutiveness and har-
mony in the treatment of it. 
The author is a man of no merely amateur accomplishments in the arena 
of dialectical thought and discussion. He has convictions of his own and 
he is not wanting in courage or ability to enforce them. He disclaims origi-
nality or, more accurately, he affirms his endeavor to avoid it. In this, what-
ever his own modesty may lead him to declare, it will hardly be unjust to 
charge him with some measure of failure. 
It may be more surprising to the savants of the opening century that a 
new and somewhat original philosophy should come out of the utilitarian and 
Mammon-worshiping city of Chicago than it was to them of old time that 
any good thing should come out of Nazareth; but in both instances the thing 
which surprises is the thing that comes to pass. Dr. Paul Carus is the 
brilliant author and persistent proponent of this new philosophy. It is 
neither possible nor desirable to set forth in full its postulates and principles 
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CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS. 453 
in this review, and yet, as all theology banks up against philosophy, and 
as this system—in so far true to the philosophical instinct and necessity— 
explicitly invades the realm of religious thought and ethical motive, we may 
examine the elements of this American positivism for the sake of its placement 
in the general scheme of modern philosophical encyclopaedia, and of learning 
what are not only its alleged but also its logical and implicit bearings upon 
the intellectual elements of the Christian religion. 
Dr. Carus conceives the problem of philosophy to be "the arrangement 
of all knowledge into one harmonious system which will be a unitary con-
ception of the world and can serve as a basis for ethics" (i, 7 ) ' He admits 
that his Monism differs from other philosophies in this, that it "is not a 
finished system but a plan for a system" (i, 24). The unitary conception 
is the goal of philosophy. This conception presupposes the idea of the con-
tinuity of nature which, however, he significantly says, "has not yet been 
proved in all its details" (1, 7) . This unity of Reality must be unqualifiedly 
accepted. It is true in thought because it is true in fact. This conception is 
grounded on positive facts, and therefore the system is called "Positivism"— 
a term which, although he adopts it, he cannot accept with the connotation 
of M. Auguste Comte, who introduced it. Facts are ultimates; they are equally 
real or equally unreal. "Monism" also designates this philosophy of the 
unitary conception. But this Monism is not a "one substance theory:" 
Spinoza's doctrine was a pseudo-Monism, a "Henism." The author is He-
gelian enough to tell us that Monism is a "recognition of dualities and their 
reconciliation in higher unities" (ii, 76, 77). Idealism affirms spirit only 
and Realism affirms matter only, whereas in truth both spirit and matter 
are mere abstracts and neither exists. True Monism recognizes the oneness of 
All-Existence. There are no differences of kind in this One; no Creator 
and created, no supernatural and natural, no divine and human. God and 
the universe are One. All nature is alive. Haeckel says that all nature has 
intelligence; this is "panpsychism." Carus says all nature is alive or has the 
capacity to live; this is "panbiotism" (ii, 170). Life is an immanent property 
of matter. There is organic life and inorganic life; the former no doubt 
originated in the latter. But the barrier between them has been broken down 
by modern thought, and life is now recognized as a fundamental property 
of matter ; indeed, "it must be eternal" (i, m ) . Reality is indivisible; the 
most important abstracts are matter, force and form—these three, but the 
greatest of these is form. 
Epistemologically stated, all knowledge has its root in sensation and sen-
sation is primarily feeling and not choice, as Professor Romanes believed. 
Feeling is fundamental and the rationale of feeling is purely biological. In 
'For convenience in reference, I indicate the fir.t volume nameil at the beginning as volume i 
and thi: second as volume as ii. 
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454 THE MONIST. 
the development of knowledge from feeling the conditioning factor is memory, 
and this memory is nothing more than the psychological aspect of certain pre-
served physiological forms in sentient substance (i, 12). Constant special 
irritation has created special senses; the unity of consciousness is the product 
of the whole organism and the soul is not an entity; it is not a separate or 
separable independent something; it is only "the psychical aspect of all the 
organic forms of our body" (i, 14). The old ego-centric psychology is 
abandoned and the new is accepted, which regards "the center of conscious-
ness as the strongest feeling at a given time which as such naturally pre-
dominates over and eclipses the other feelings of the organism" (ii, 195). 
Metaphysically stated, the ultimate category of thought is to be found in 
the laws of form. These are eternal, irrefragable and everywhere the same. 
They are always "correct, i. e., the truths of formal thought, but they are not 
always real, i. e., the truths of a well-ascertained experience" (i, 69). The 
real is not a necessary existence; but if it do exist, then it must exist in 
accordance with these laws of form. The ultimate of thought is not any 
thing-in-itself, but forms-in-themselves. 
Kant nodded in overlooking the essential difference between the sub-
jective and the ideal, and the consequent confusion weakens the very founda-
tions of his system. The ideal belongs to the realm of ideas and is therefore 
metaphysically eternaf; the subjective belongs only to the realm of the 
thinking or feeling agent, and is therefore psychologically variable. Kant 
distinguishes between the a priori and the a posteriori correctly enough, but 
he attributes the former only to subjectivity; and, whereas he erroneously 
makes the subjective equivalent to the ideal, the truth is that the infinitely 
important part of the subjective of Kant, namely, the ideal as correctly con-
ceived, is preeminently, if not exclusively, entitled to the honors of the 0 
priori. For, indeed, from the evolutionistic and Monistic point of view the 
subjective is really not a priori in any correct sense at all, seeing that it 
pertains simply to the perceiving or the conceiving subject; and to us men 
this subject, this soul or mind or ego or what-not, is only a fragment or 
moment of the Great All-One. Man, like charcoal, is simply "transformed 
solar heat;" and "mind is not something different from the world, but must 
be considered as its product and highest efflorescence" (ii, 22). Hence Kant 
was wrong in regarding the mind as able actively to import forms into phe-
nomena; these mind-forms or categories of thought are only a reflection of 
the forms of objective existence, preserved in the plastic but ceaselessly 
crystallizing sentient substance. The subjective a priori is liable to all the 
mutations and fluctuations of a psychological experience; the ideal a priori, 
which is Dr. Carus' a priori, resides in these eternal, imperial, immanent and 
even "supernatural" (ii, 87) laws of form. 
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So much may serve imperfectly to give to one unfamiliar with this philos-
ophy a rough but true conception of its teachings and tendencies. Its author 
argues for its truth very earnestly and sometimes with much force. In the 
course of his arguments he says many things which are both excellent and 
true, but we are now dealing, not with detached thoughts in his system, but 
with the system itself. 
Dr. Cams frankly acknowledges his indebtedness to Kant. He regards 
his own position as the natural outcome of the critical philosophy, but not 
without very important differences. He calls it Kantism developed, broad-
ened, matured and adapted to our time. "It is a protest against the halfness 
of agnosticism and a rejection of the perverted ethics of hedonism" (i, vi). 
Both intellectual and ethical excellences are claimed in its behalf. It "means 
perspicuous simplicity. It is the systematic and clear conception of an in-
telligible reality." It is the "classical philosophy" (i, 251). Materialism in-
variably leads to hedonism or utilitarianism; spiritualism or idealism leads to 
asceticism; but this classical philosophy "finds the purpose of existence in the 
constant aspiration of realizing a higher and better, a nobler and more beau-
tiful state of existence" (i, 189). In short, it is a new gospel not only for 
the philosopher in his search for truth, but also for the people in their chase 
for happiness and fulness of life. 
All this is promising, but what is to be expected in the performance? Is 
this new occidental philosophy pagan or Christian? Does it square well 
or ill with the things most surely believed throughout the Church of God? 
Does it ring true or false to what Christendom reveres as the Word of God, 
and does it acknowledge or regard the fundamental elements of Christianity? 
In finding its theological and religious valuation, we have two methods 
within our reach. We may take the plain utterances of the author himself 
as bearing upon our inquiry, or we may take his system and decide upon it for 
ourselves. 
For himself, the author, while claiming everything for his philosophy, 
frankly affirms his radical break with evangelical Christianity. He tells us 
that he does not persist in calling himself a Christian, although to a great 
extent he gladly accepts Christ's ethics. He regards Christ and Christianity 
as radically different. He seeks the direct revelation of God in the facts 
of life and solemnly warns us that "the surrender of science is the way to 
perdition." If theism is identical with supernaturalism—and it certainly is— 
then he tells us that he must beg to be classed among the atheists. There is 
no disputing the correctness of this classification; and, as a confession of 
faith, we have here enough to place Dr. Carus among the Philistines. 
But, passing by the teacher, let us look into his teaching to see whither it 
tends, theologically. The bottom postulate of a philosophy correlates with the 
theistic conception in theology. Dr. Carus' final postulate is the "Laws of 
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456 THE MONIST. 
Form." Metaphysically, this foundation hangs in midair. Every impulse of 
the modern philosophical spirit, crying out for the ultimate personality, is 
ignored and repulsed. We fail to see wherein the positing of these eternal 
laws has a single advantage in the search for a metaphysical terra firma; and 
certainly the considerations which have brought the sanest and strongest of 
the accredited philosophers in Christendom, especially in recent times, to 
acknowledge personality as the highest note and final category of our think-
ing are, metaphysically regarded, incomparably to be preferred. But with 
Dr. Carus these laws are God. "By God we understand the order of the 
world that makes harmony, evolution, aspiration and morality possible" 
(i, 152). He conceives God to be not less than a person, but more; and yet, 
building perhaps more consistently than he intended, he calls God "it" and 
not "Him." The conception of God as a person is poetry, not science. These 
eternal laws "possess all those qualities which a pious reflection has attributed 
to God" (see i, p. 54). The Cosmos, which is the One, which is God, is the 
foundation of morality. "We may compare it to a father and with Christ 
call it 'Our Father,' just as well as we like to speak of Mother Nature" 
(i, 323). But it must be remembered that this is only a simile which, if carried 
out, would lead to serious misapprehension. 
This is not exactly the theism of the decalogue. Monism is monotheism, 
but wait to hear what kind of monotheism it i s : "God is not one in number, 
but one in kind. He is unique. To believe in one God, as opposed to several 
Gods, is a pagan view which is more advanced than polytheism, but remains 
upon the same level" (ii, 15s, 156). Monism revises the second word of the 
law and tells us that even as we shall not bow down ourselves to graven 
images nor serve them, so also we shall not bow down before the true God 
which is the AU-in-All to worship it. "We do not call the All God in order 
10 bow down into the dust and to adore it. We regard adoration as a pagan 
custom which, it is a pity, survived in Christianity" (i, 261). TTfis is a con-
sistent corollary, it is t rue ; but it is the consistency of a deliberate and down-
right twentieth century paganism, which not only would smash the shrines 
of all creeds and cults, but also would throttle the very instinct of religion 
in man, which leads him upward toward his God. Religion is only man's 
aspiration to be in harmony with the All ; it matters not how well he succeeds; 
it matters not that, whatever he is or becomes or does, he is still, in spite of 
himself, a part of the Al l ; only let him aspire, and that is the Alpha and 
Omega of religion. 
Nor is this new Positivism less advanced in its doctrine of Man. Talis 
Deus, qualis homo. Man is the flower of nature—not even its fruit. Mr. 
Edison says that, in its own little way, the atom is everything that man is. 
Dr. Carus agrees, and yet the atom itself is but a convenient scientific fiction. 
The ego is no entity. Memory produces selfhood, not vice versa. Person-
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CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS. 457 
ality is the symbolical thread on which are strung the beads of our existence. 
The ideas which live in us constitute the self. Abstract thought helped to 
make man man; but, pray, how could it help to "make" him man, seeing that 
lie must needs be man before he could be helped by it? Truth is relation; 
if it has any meaning, it is correct cognition. Man is the child of the cosmic 
past; but the Cosmos is the All-God; therefore, man is the son of God. As 
a rational being "man's begetter is not his brute progenitor, but the eternal 
order of the universe" (ii, 224, 225). This is fatalism stripped of every shred 
of the idea of providence or plan or personality. Such an anthropology is 
quickly self-interpreting. Man is but a coordinating factor in the living All. 
Atoms are centers of living spontaneity. There is no push or pull of gravity 
from without; all nature lives. This all-pervading spontaneity comes to the 
front in God-like beauty in the moral character of man. But he is dust and 
• inly dust; into dust he need not return, for only dust he ever is. "Christ's 
words are literally true when he says, 'God is able of these stones to raise 
up children unto Abraham'" (ii, 54). Any doctrine of man which makes his 
soul to consist only of a series of successive states, whether taught by Em-
mons or Spencer or Dr. Cams, takes away the franchise for any intelligent 
notion of immortality which involves a continual personal existence and 
consciousness after death, and so does violence not only to the Christian re-
ligion, but also to the highest extra-Christian faiths of mankind. 
But it is needless to compass all sides of this pretentious philosophy. 
The touchstone of any system of thought is to be found in its attitude 
toward theism. Its teachings must have either a direct or an indirect theo-
logical reference. Not that the philosopher must wait with a "By your leave" 
for the theologian; but the theologian must find room for himself within the 
pale of a philosophy or he forthwith declines to abide there. 
The principles of this Positivism are a direct negation of many of the 
most elementary truths of Christianity. Its unitary conception is not the unity 
of truth, hut the essential kinship, the identity of the All ; the oneness of the 
whole enclosing circumference of reality, together with all that it encloses, 
ft is Pantheism robbed of its mystical adorations and its confessedly somewhat 
redeeming features. It is Cosmism, scorning the more and more generous 
conceptions to Christianity of the lamented author of The Outlines of the 
Cosmic Philosophy. It is not so far from Comte's Positivism as it imagines; 
for it regards with patient and patronizing complacency the crude anthropo-
morphisms and excrescences of mankind's present religious state, remembering 
that mythology is ever an indispensable ladder to be climbed in making the 
difficult ascent to truth. 
Dr. Carus is at no pains to make his peace with evangelical theology. 
He has chosen his own way, but he will never win the thought or the heart 
of humanity. His philosophy will be accurately classed as atheistic, and athe-
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ism is false philosophy. To make God One with the Cosmos is, to an ardent 
scientist who makes the way of science the way of life and the surrender 
of science the way of death, not acosmism, as Spinoza, the God-intoxicated 
man, would hold it, but atheism, as the world-intoxicated scientist is bound 
to hold it in the end. For the human mind is not ingenious enough to be 
able to hold consistently the same thing as God and the world. Its faith 
becomes either atheistic pancosmism or pantheistic acosmism. However suc-
essful Spinoza was in holding consistently to the latter, this new philosophy, 
with its commendable but overstated loyalty to empirical science, is essen-
tially the former, pure and simple. 
The merit of this philosophy is that it wears no disguise. It spurns the 
idea of the unknowable and truly argues that all that exists is capable of 
being known. Like all other implicitly atheistic systems, it is inconsistent 
enough to substitute eternal law for God and the Cosmos for the basis of 
the indispensable authority in religion and in ethics. It withholds Mr. 
Spencer's patronizing but inconsistent sop to the superstitions of the re-
ligious and coldly bids men, since there is nothing adorable to adore, to cease 
from the pagan folly of adoration. This forbids all worship of God; and why 
not? for there is no God such as men could worship. The Great Teacher 
said to the woman of Samaria: "God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him 
must worship Him in spirit and in truth." The voice of the new Positivism, 
speaking forth from the shores of Lake Michigan, says: "Spirit is not a 
substance; spirit is the significance of words;" and, again, "Adoration is a 
pagan custom which, it is a pity, survived in Christianity." 
TRENTON. HENRY COLLIN MINTON. 
THE GOD OF SCIENCE. 
IN REPLY TO REV. HENRY COLLIN MINTON. 
AMONG recent reviews of my works, a criticism of Fundamental Problems 
and The Surd of Metaphysics by Rev. Henry Collin Minton of Trenton, 
which appeared in The Princeton Theological Review, is distinguished by 
fairness and gives upon the whole a correct statement of my views; yet it con-
tains at the same time a vigorous denunciation of my philosophy as 
atheistic and hostile to Christianity, if not to religion in general, I wish 
to submit the case to all who are inclined to agree with Mr. Minton for 
reconsideration, and, in order to let readers of The Monist judge for them-
selves, I take pleasure in reprinting his review in its entirety, and will limit 
my answer only to the most important point at issue—the objection of atheism. 
Mr. Minton overlooks the distinction made by me, between Determinism 
and Fatalism; he claims that I say "Man is dust and only dust; unto dust 
he need not return, for only dust he ever was." Obviously, Mr. Minton 
mixes me up (strange though it may seem) with Yahveh, the God of the 
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